How Europe’s conflict with Russia may develop

Source link : https://love-europe.com/2024/09/24/moldova/how-europes-conflict-with-russia-may-develop/

The West must think ahead in its relationship with Russia. Even if the warring parties ultimately agree to a cease-fire in Ukraine, it would not end Europe’s confrontation with Moscow.

How long will the war last? Ukrainian soldiers in the Sumi region near the Russian border.

Thomas Peter / Reuters

Even after a duration of more than 2 1/2 years, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to dominate the debate on European security. And how could it be otherwise?

Russian President Vladimir Putin crossed a red line in February 2022, and in so doing openly challenged the European security order. Among the core principles of this order are the inviolability of borders between sovereign nation states, and the prohibition on wars of aggression.

Yet Russia has gone beyond a war of aggression. It is waging a war of conquest, which involves annexing the territory of another country. The declared aim of the war is to bring the existence of the independent Ukrainian nation and the sovereign Ukrainian state to an end.

Russia is thus attacking the foundations on which Europe’s security, prosperity and freedom are based. This is an order that was established in Western Europe after World War II, and was adopted by the continent’s eastern nations after the end of the Cold War, with NATO and the EU serving as its central pillars.

The war has radically transformed Europe’s relationship with Russia. The idea of establishing a close partnership with Moscow, which has been an underlying theme in the West’s Russia policy since the end of the Cold War, has clearly failed. As yet, there is no coherent new Russia policy. Today, following Washington’s lead, Europe has agreed on a dual approach entailing support for Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia.

Under such conditions, how will the relationship with Russia develop in the years to come? Four scenarios are conceivable: a direct conflict with Russia, persisting tensions, a modus vivendi and a regime change in Russia. Below, I present four possible scenarios that could play out by 2030 – that is, the medium-term future.

1. Open conflict with Russia

This scenario is the most unlikely. But at the same time, it is enormously important for the present – because it describes a possible future that present-day actions must absolutely prevent.

Russia is already building up its military capacities, investing massively in its armed forces. In this process, it is being supported by a number of partners: by China especially with dual-use goods, by Iran with drones and ballistic missiles, and by North Korea with ammunition and other items relevant to fighting the war.

Moreover, Putin has repeatedly made it clear that he is not interested solely in Ukraine, but also in a dominant position in Eastern and East-Central Europe.

A frontal attack by Russia is the least likely scenario. By contrast, an effort by Moscow to provoke an incident is within the realm of possibility. The Baltic states would be a natural place for this. Russia could then invade under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. This would force NATO states either to respond militarily or, by failing to act, to reveal the hollowness of NATO’s promise of collective defense – and thus weaken European security. Over the long term, this would open up further opportunities for Russia.

Moscow could take this step if it was provoked by Western weakness, or even by the appearance of it. A lack of unity in the West and a new Russia policy that relies on new concessions to Moscow – for example after a cease-fire in Ukraine – could be interpreted as weakness.

How this scenario might develop would depend on the West’s reaction. Swift, resolute opposition could contain the conflict and keep it at the level of an «incident.» By contrast, prolonged hesitation would allow Russia to drive a wedge into the alliance – between the countries of Eastern and Northern Europe, which are determined to arrest Russian expansion even if the price is high, and the countries that hope instead to reach a compromise with Russia grounded in the give and take of power politics.

2. Persistent tensions

A second scenario for the coming years would be a continuation of tensions at the current level. In this possible future, Russia continues to attack Ukraine, and there are periods both of intensified warfare and calm, possibly in the form of a cease-fire. However, both sides regard winning the war as a possibility. Thus, neither side gives up.

At the same time, Russia doubles down on its hybrid warfare against the West, engaging in disinformation and propaganda as well as occasional disguised attacks. It places particularly great pressure on Georgia and Moldova, and continues its creeping annexation of Belarus.

The West remains hesitant in its support for Ukraine. It continues to provide enough aid to keep Ukraine from giving up and allow it to continue fighting Russia, but too little to allow Kyiv to bring a decisive end to the war in its own favor.

3. A new modus vivendi

Another possibility is that the West ultimately gives full backing to Ukraine. Following a cease-fire, Ukraine is so secure behind the West’s pledge of military support that it becomes hopeless for Russia to continue the war.

Under this scenario, the West builds up the Ukrainian armed forces and supplies what is needed. Because Ukraine now has reliable security guarantees, investors come back into the country, refugees return and Ukraine begins to recover. At the same time, Georgia and Moldova are offered protection against a Russian takeover.

Russia thus loses the military option in its western neighborhood. Although it can continue to conduct hybrid operations, it is deterred from doing so, because the West is strengthening its own armed forces, and presenting itself as a reliable partner to the countries in the region.

The relationship between Russia and the West remains tense. However, the unambiguously drawn lines between what will be accepted and what will not allow the West to make concessions to Russia without compromising its own clear position in the area of security and defense.

4. Regime change in Russia

The fourth scenario is less likely. A successor to Putin would presumably continue his course. However, it is unclear whether such a figure would swiftly be able to exercise a similar amount of power, or be able to control the country as effectively as Putin. It could be that a Putin successor would lack the capacity to attempt any conquest of neighboring countries, because the new officeholder would first have to consolidate power within Russia itself.

It is even possible that any such shift would involve not only a change of leadership, but also a change in the character of the regime, and that more liberal positions would once again prevail. As after Josef Stalin’s death in 1953, there could be another thaw in Moscow, thus providing opportunities for an opening toward the West.

In such a case, the West would have to make deliberate efforts to extend new offers of cooperation and integration to Russia – without, as happened after the end of the Cold War, turning a blind eye or two to questions of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors. The prerequisite for cooperation must be a clear renunciation of imperial ambitions.

Influence of the West

The West must be prepared for a range of possible scenarios. What happens in Russia cannot be controlled from the outside. But the West is in a position to shape the strategic environment in which Russia operates, which in turn has an impact on Russia itself.

The more clearly the West rejects Moscow’s attempt to use military force and hybrid warfare to regain a dominant position of power in Eastern and East-Central Europe, the more likely it is that Russia will abandon this project. This is because the country has fewer power resources at its disposal than Europe.

Defense and deterrence must be key elements of Europe’s self-confident response to the new Russian imperialism. Secure borders make good neighbors. If Europe wants to live in peace with an expansionist Russia, it must demonstrate that it is both tough and resolute, and invest in its own armed forces. As the past few years have repeatedly shown, this cannot be achieved with diplomacy, friendly words and concessions. Europe must shape the balance of power in its own favor.